

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
27 February 2012
English
Original: French

**Letter dated 27 February 2012 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to bring to your attention the attached letter, dated 20 February 2012, from the Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mr. Alexander Vershbow, transmitting the report on the international security presence in Kosovo covering the period from 1 July to 30 September 2011 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) **BAN Ki-moon**



Annex

[Original: English]

In accordance with paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I attach a report on the operations of the Kosovo Force covering the period from 1 July to 30 September 2011 (see enclosure).

I would appreciate it if you would make this report available to the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alexander **Vershbow**

Enclosure

Report to the United Nations on the operations of the Kosovo Force

Introduction

1. The present report on the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is provided in accordance with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and covers the period from 1 July to 30 September 2011.

2. As at 30 September 2011, the total number of KFOR troops in theatre was 6,200. This includes an Operational Reserve Force battalion, which was deployed in theatre in the aftermath of the events of July 2011 in the northern part of Kosovo.

Security situation and operations

3. The overall security situation in theatre by the end of the reporting period remained calm but volatile in the northern part of Kosovo.

4. On 25 July, Kosovo Police regional operational special units tried to enforce a trade embargo at crossing points Gate 1 and DOG 31. This provoked a violent reaction by Kosovo Serb demonstrators in the northern part of Kosovo, who set up roadblocks on several roads leading to the crossing points. KFOR responded to the events by deploying its Quick Reaction Force, and the Commander of KFOR immediately engaged in discussions with local representatives to defuse the situation.

5. On 27 July, violence occurred at Gate 1, where Kosovo Serb demonstrators set fire to the Gate and a number of cars. KFOR troops used tear gas in order to extricate themselves from the crowd. On 28 July both Gate 1 and DOG 31 were reinforced by KFOR and the situation calmed down, although it remained tense. On 1 August, the Commander of KFOR requested reinforcements from the out-of-theatre reserve forces to sustain ongoing operations at Gate 1 and DOG 31. On 9 August, a jointly manned German and Austrian Operational Reserve Force battalion was deployed to the KFOR area of operation to provide increased capability.

6. On 28 August, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe visited KFOR, where he received briefings from the Commander of KFOR, Major General Erhard Bühler, on the security situation in Kosovo. In addition, he met with the Head of the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), General Xavier Bout de Marnhac, and visited KFOR troops in the northern part of Kosovo.

7. On 3 September, KFOR formally handed over policing tasks for the Montenegro border to the Kosovo Border and Boundary Police.

8. On 8 September, the NATO Military Committee visited KFOR. This visit provided the opportunity for national military representatives from KFOR troop-contributing countries to receive situational briefings from the KFOR Commander as well as other key players.

9. On 9 September, the change of command ceremony for the Commander of KFOR was held in Pristina, with Major General Erhard Drews assuming command from Major General Erhard Bühler.

10. On 15 September, the NATO Secretary General visited KFOR and held a series of meetings with the Commander of KFOR and all other key players in Kosovo. On 16 September, EULEX officially assumed Customs responsibilities from KFOR at Gate 1 and DOG 31. KFOR, in its third responder role, continued to support EULEX/Kosovo Police operations at the gates in order to maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement.

11. On 25 September, KFOR, as third responder, conducted enhanced security operations in close coordination with EULEX and the Kosovo Police during the consecration of the Serbian Orthodox Church of the Holy Resurrection in Dakovica. This event was attended without incident by approximately 150 persons from the Serbian Orthodox Church.

12. On 27 September, in support of EULEX, KFOR enlarged the security perimeter around Gate 1 to enable EULEX to set up a vehicle checkpoint on the gate bypass recently installed by Kosovo Serb demonstrators. In reaction, Kosovo Serb individuals gathered at the scene in a protest which turned violent when demonstrators started throwing stones at KFOR soldiers. KFOR responded by firing rubber bullets. The situation quickly deteriorated and a number of explosive devices were thrown towards KFOR troops. During an attempt by Kosovo Serb demonstrators to breach the security perimeter, a KFOR soldier was physically assaulted and one weapon was stolen; other soldiers were injured. A KFOR soldier fired a single shot in self-defence, striking an attacking demonstrator in the leg. The Commander of KFOR arrived at the scene to personally assess the situation. Later that day, the situation calmed down, protesters dispersed and the situation remained quiet.

New North Atlantic Treaty Organization tasks

13. Early in the reporting period, Kosovo Security Force (KSF) units participated in a joint exercise with EULEX and KFOR, always in compliance with the KSF mandate. This exercise showed considerable improvement in the execution of their tasks by KSF units. The after-action review highlighted the ability of KSF with regard to core capabilities within its mandate. During the reporting period, KSF members attended a number of courses in accordance with the annual training plan. Courses were well prepared and instructors presented good professional skills.

14. A KSF Cadet School Programme board meeting was convened from 18 to 20 July. Forty candidates were interviewed, and this process resulted in the selection of 10 of them. Training commenced on 5 September. Over the years, the KSF Cadet School Programme has proved to be very effective. On successful completion of the five-year programme, these KSF members will receive a university degree (Columbia University, distance learning).

15. During the reporting period, KSF conducted the following engineering projects: suspected mass grave investigation at Zhilivoda; continuation of the KSF Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company's demining operations in Xerxe-Dragash, Raushiq-Peja, Vushtrri and Ferizaj; clearance of the mined area in the vicinity of Podujevo, where 17 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed; road construction (5 km) between Burnik and Grebno, in Ferizaj and Strpce municipalities.

16. Recently, the NATO Headquarters Civil Emergency Planning Committee extended support to KFOR, to continue KSF training contributions from Finland and Bulgaria. Finland contributes to two courses for KSF, one on hazardous materials and the other on firefighting. Both courses will be conducted locally in the KSF civil protection regiment. Bulgaria has offered to conduct a vehicle rescue and extrication course, at its national training centre.

Summary

17. KFOR, in close coordination with EULEX and the Kosovo Police, continued to work towards guaranteeing a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens in Kosovo. The situation in the northern part of Kosovo is still potentially volatile and several roadblocks continue to hamper the freedom of movement for the local population, EULEX and KFOR troops. Illegal bypasses at the Administrative Boundary Line and smuggling activities constitute a persistent problem. KFOR continues to monitor the situation closely and maintains its deterrent posture to react quickly and decisively if necessary.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
28 February 2012
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 27 February 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to draw attention to the following:

It has become apparent to all that certain foreign parties are deliberately and openly fabricating charges that the Syrian authorities are responsible for all the killings and acts of violence that are being perpetrated by armed terrorist groups in Syria. Those parties are feverishly and hysterically competing among themselves to level blindly such charges, without offering any credible information or facts and pre-empting the results of investigations, in order to carry out their plans, which are aimed at undermining Syria's stability and security, by providing the above-mentioned groups with arms and money, as well as media and political cover, including in international forums, for their terrorist actions, which are indiscriminately directed against civilians and military personnel as well as public and private institutions. The Syrian authorities, meanwhile, have been doing everything required to discover the facts surrounding those terrorist acts by conducting credible investigations based on verified information and diligent follow-up. Nonetheless, the same foreign parties are ignoring the results of those national investigations and keeping them from the media and political circles, in order to ensure that the world does not hear the truth.

In that connection, we are surprised to hear such deceptive charges being made in the chamber of the Security Council, which is responsible for maintaining international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations. This includes the statement made by the Prime Minister of Qatar at the Council's meeting of 31 January 2012, in which he claimed, inter alia, that the Syrian authorities had killed Ibrahim Qaqush, saying that oppression has reached unimaginable proportions when the throats of those who chant slogans are slashed, as was the case with Ibrahim Qaqush. In that connection, we would like to point out the following:

Investigations conducted by the competent Syrian authorities into the killing of Ibrahim Qaqush (father's name: Walid; mother's name: Wahbiyyah; place of birth: north Hama; date of birth: 1982) revealed that Bashar Saraqibi (father's name: Hassan; mother's name: Nadirah; place of birth: Bab al-Jisr, Hama; date of birth: 1973) and Hisham Abdulqadir (father's name: Abdulqadir; mother's name: Su'ad; place of birth: Bab al-Jisr, Hama; date of birth: 1972) are complicit in the killing of Qaqush. The criminal Saraqibi confessed that another criminal, Ahmad Musa



Taybani, had asked him to kill Qaush because the latter was an informant for the security agencies. Saraqibi added that he and Abdulqadir, acting on the orders of Taybani and fearing his power, murdered Qaush in the Bab al-Nahr district of Hama and threw his body into the Asi River. Both Saraqibi and Abdulqadir were brought before the military prosecutor on 16 January 2012.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Bashar Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
29 February 2012

Original: English

**Benin, Colombia, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Morocco,
South Africa, Togo and United States of America: draft resolution**

The Security Council,

Recalling its statement of 30 August 2011 and its resolution 2018 (2011) of 31 October 2011, on piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea,

Expressing its deep concern about the threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea pose to international navigation, security and the economic development of states in the region,

Recognizing that piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea affect littoral countries, including their hinterland areas and landlocked countries in the region,

Expressing its concern over the threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea pose to the safety of seafarers and other persons, including through their being taken as hostages, and deeply concerned by the violence employed by pirates and persons involved in piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea,

Affirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, in particular its articles 100, 101 and 105, sets out the legal framework applicable to countering piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities,

Affirming its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States of the Gulf of Guinea and their neighbours,

Further affirming that the provisions of this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea,

Recognizing the urgent need to devise and adopt effective and practical measures to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea,

Emphasizing the importance of building on existing national, regional and extraregional initiatives to enhance maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea,

Welcoming the initiatives already taken by States in the region and regional organizations, including the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) and the Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA), to enhance maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea,



Noting the ECCAS comprehensive joint maritime security architecture to counter piracy in the Central African subregion, including the strategy adopted by the ECCAS Peace and Security Council in February 2008, the establishment of the Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) in Pointe-Noire, Congo, as well as the multinational coordination centres in the region,

Further noting the preparatory steps taken by ECOWAS towards developing a maritime security approach through an Integrated Maritime Security Strategy and an Integrated Maritime Plan,

Noting the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach led by the countries of the region to counter the threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and their underlying causes,

Also noting the need for international assistance as part of a comprehensive strategy to support national and regional efforts to assist States in the region with their efforts to address piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea,

Stressing that the coordination of efforts at the regional level is necessary for the development of a comprehensive strategy to counter the threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, in order to enable the prevention and interdiction of such criminal activities and to ensure that persons engaging in piracy and armed robbery at sea are prosecuted and punished if convicted, with due regard for internationally recognized rules and principles of international law,

Reiterating that States in the region have a leadership role to play in countering the threat and addressing the underlying causes of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, in close cooperation with organizations in the region, and their partners,

Welcoming the contributions by Member States and international organizations in support of ongoing national and regional efforts to secure Gulf of Guinea coastal areas and conduct naval operations, including the joint patrols carried out by the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Benin off the coast of Benin, and also welcoming further contributions, upon request,

Expressing its concern about the serious threats to international peace and stability in different regions of the world, in particular in West Africa and the Sahel Region, posed by transnational organized crime, including illicit weapons and drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea,

Affirming its full commitment to promoting the maintenance of peace and stability in the Gulf of Guinea region,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General's assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, which was dispatched to the region from 7 to 24 November 2011;
2. *Encourages* national authorities, as well as regional and international partners to consider implementing the recommendations of the assessment mission, as appropriate;
3. *Stresses* the primary responsibility of the States of the Gulf of Guinea to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and in this context urges them through ECCAS, ECOWAS and the GGC to work towards the convening

of the planned joint Summit of Gulf of Guinea States to develop a regional anti-piracy strategy, in cooperation with the African Union;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General through the United Nations Office of West Africa (UNOWA) and the United Nations Office of Central Africa (UNOCA) to support States and subregional organizations in convening the joint Summit, as referenced in resolution 2018 (2012), to the extent feasible;

5. *Urges* States of the region of the Gulf of Guinea to take prompt action, at national and regional levels with the support of the international community where able, and by mutual agreement, to develop and implement national maritime security strategies, including for the establishment of a legal framework for the prevention, and repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea and as well as prosecution of persons engaging in those crimes, and punishment of those convicted of those crimes and encourages regional cooperation in this regard;

6. *Encourages* Benin and Nigeria to extend their joint patrols beyond March 2012, while the countries of the Gulf of Guinea continue to work towards building their capacities to independently secure their coastlines and *also encourages* international partners to consider providing support, as needed, in that regard and to the extent feasible;

7. *Encourages* the States of the Gulf of Guinea, ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC, to develop and implement transnational and transregional maritime security coordination centres covering the whole region of the Gulf of Guinea, building on existing initiatives, such as those under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO);

8. *Encourages* international partners to provide support to regional States and organizations for the enhancement of their capabilities to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, including their capacity to conduct regional patrols, to establish and maintain joint coordination centres and joint information-sharing centres, and for the effective implementation of the regional strategy, once adopted;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to support efforts towards mobilizing resources following the creation of the regional strategy to assist in building national and regional capacities in close consultation with States and regional and extraregional organizations;

10. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed through UNOWA and UNOCA, on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, including on progress made regarding the joint Summit as well as by ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC to develop a comprehensive strategy to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea;

11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.